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1. Introduction  
Hayn (1995) was the first to point out a discontinuity at zero in the distribution of earnings. 
Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) systematically showed that the discontinuity occurs in the distribution of 
earnings change as well as earnings, suggesting that it could be caused by earnings management to avoid 
earnings decreases and losses. Since then, a number of studies have found similar phenomena for particular 
types of institutions and for different countries.1 Degeorge et al. (1999) found a similar discontinuity in the 
distribution of earnings surprise (i.e., negative forecast error) using forecast data in 1974-1996. Bhojraj et 
al. (2009) also documented such a discontinuity using forecast data in 1988-2006. Using simulation results 
based on an analytical model, I show that the widely documented discontinuity can be partly due to a steep 
increase in density appearing like a discontinuity when a continuous distribution is plotted in terms of 
frequency counts in histogram bins. The steep increase in density is a consequence of the compression of 
unmanaged earnings into reported earnings toward an earnings benchmark as a result of cookie-jar earnings 
management. This provides an alternative explanation to the discontinuity phenomenon, supplementing the 
prevalent explanation based on upward earnings management by “just-missed” firms.2  
Besides a discontinuity at zero, the distributions of the earnings triplet (i.e., earnings, earnings change, 
and earnings surprise) usually have a volcano shape (see, e.g., figure 2 of Bhojraj et al. 2009, reproduced as 
figure 5b here). The sharp peak of this shape is markedly different from the smoother, flatter top of the bell 
shape of a normal distribution, or that of similar alternatives such as logistic or extreme value type I 
distributions. To my knowledge, no prior study has highlighted the volcano shape of the distributions, let 
alone explain it. Because of the compression of earnings arising from cookie-jar earnings management 
attempts, even if the distribution of unmanaged earnings were normal (as one might expect), the 
distribution of managed earnings can have a volcano shape. Auditors sometimes require adjustments to 
remove earnings management attempts (Nelson et al. 2002).3 Consequently, the distribution of reported 
earnings observed by the public is a mixture of the distributions of unmanaged and managed earnings. The 
                                                   
1 For example, banks (Beatty et al. 2002), property-casualty insurers (Beaver et al. 2003), nonprofit hospitals 
(Leone and Van Horn 2005), hotels (Parte Esteban and Such Devesa 2011), Australia (Coulton et al. 2005), European 
Union (Daske et al. 2006), UK (Gore et al. 2007), Japan (Shuto 2009), and Spain (Parte Esteban and Such Devesa 
2011). 
2 A number of studies have examined whether this prevalent explanation is indeed the main cause (Dechow et 
al. 2003, Durtschi and Easton 2005 and 2009, Beaver et al. 2007, Jacob and Jorgensen 2007, and Kerstein and Rai 
2007). While reasons behind the discontinuity are subject to debate, the phenomenon itself is not. 
3 Among the 515 specific attempts of earnings management recalled by audit partners and managers in the 
Nelson et al. (2002) study, auditors adjusted 44% of the attempts. The rest were not adjusted because the auditor 
lacked convincing evidence to prove that the client’s position was incorrect (17%) or the auditor believed the client 
demonstrated compliance with GAAP (21%), with the remaining 18% due to other reasons (usually, immateriality).   
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mixture can retain the volcano-shape characteristics of the unmanaged earnings distribution. I illustrate this 
explanation using simulation results based on an analytical model that takes into account auditor-required 
adjustment. Prior models of misreporting have omitted this aspect in order to focus on other issues, such as 
the interaction between a firm’s disclosure and investors’ rational expectation.  
Many of the studies investigating earnings management and fraud are empirical-based, with only a few 
of them (e.g., Kedia and Philippon 2009) closely guided by formal theoretical models. Models of 
misreporting exist in the literature (e.g., Kumar and Langberg 2009, Guttman et al. 2006, Ewert and 
Wagenhofer 2005, Kirschenheiter and Melumad 2002, Sankar and Subramanyam 2001, and Fischer and 
Verrecchia 2000).4 Yet, except Caskey et al. (2010) and Newman et al. (2001), few have explicitly 
modeled the auditor, which plays an important role in the corporate reporting process (Bollen and Pool 
2009, Caramanis and Lennox 2008, Brown and Pinello 2007, and Liang 2003). Some of the models above 
have provided explanations to the discontinuity phenomenon. However, no model has given a unified 
explanation to the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions.  
The sort of earnings manipulation discussed in this paper is better understood as borderline 
misreporting rather than outright fraud. Proving the intention of borderline misreporting is often difficult. 
Usually what auditors can do is simply requiring adjustments to remove such earnings management 
attempts. In the unusual circumstances where the extent of misreporting is so outrageous to strongly 
suggest outright fraud, auditors may notify regulators. Otherwise, rarely would client firms bear any 
significant consequences of borderline misreporting disallowed by auditors. Therefore, the main 
consequence of unsuccessful borderline misreporting is the reversal of the attempted manipulations before 
announcing the earnings to the public.  
The distinction between borderline misreporting and outright fraud suggests a novel assumption on a 
firm’s cost of misreporting for downward manipulations, sometimes referred to as cookie-jar accounting. In 
contrast to the conventional quadratic assumption, I assume that the cost of misreporting is an increasing 
function of earnings manipulation, even for the negative values representing downward manipulations. In 
other words, a larger downward manipulation results in a more negative misreporting cost standing for the 
opportunity benefit of “saving for the future.” An auditor-required adjustment reversing a downward 
manipulation attempt means a reversal of the negative misreporting cost as well. 
Downward manipulations look like conservative accounting when viewed with respect to the current 
period. However, they can be used to build up cookie-jar reserves for subsequent upward manipulations 
(Cohen et al. 2011, Jackson and Liu 2010, and Moehrle 2002). Cookie-jar accounting has caused serious 
                                                   
4 I distinguish between models of misreporting that are continuous in the accounting report in concern and 
other earnings management models that focus on discrete accounting reports (e.g., Gao 2013). 
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concern to regulators. In his famous 1998 speech entitled The ‘Numbers Game’, the then Chairman of the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Arthur Levitt said: “[U]sing unrealistic assumptions to 
estimate liabilities for such items as sales returns, loan losses or warranty costs … [some companies] stash 
accruals in cookie jars during the good times and reach into them when needed in the bad times” 
(http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/spch220.txt).  
Recently, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) fined Ernst & Young (E&Y) $2 
million for failing to properly evaluate in the 2005 to 2007 audits of Medicis Pharmaceutical Corp. the 
amount set aside to account for the cost of product returns. In addition, it sanctioned three current partners 
of the audit firm plus one retired, barring some of them from auditing public companies for one to two 
years or more and imposing fines from $25,000 to $50,000. Medicis corrected the misreporting when it was 
discovered in 2008 and has restated the financial statements for the years affected. The company said: “It 
actually revealed that we were more profitable across the overall six-year restatement period.” The 
company also emphasized that “[s]everal independent reviews found that the errors didn’t stem from any 
improper efforts to inflate earnings” (Gordon 2012). This example suggests that regulators disapprove non-
inflationary manipulations as much as inflationary ones and companies do use cookie-jar accounting. The 
model of this paper accommodates cookie-jar accounting as equilibrium behavior under a wide range of 
circumstances. In contrast, models focusing on upward manipulations usually admit downward 
manipulations as possible behavior occurring infrequently in equilibrium.  
In the model, a firm manipulates the earnings before providing the figure to an auditor for audit. The 
audit allows the auditor to separate the unmanaged and manipulated components of the pre-audit 
(managed) earnings. He can require the firm to make an adjustment to remove the manipulation before 
announcing the post-audit (reported) earnings to the public. However, the auditor must incur a cost, 
privately known to him, to convince the firm to follow the requirement.5 Depending on the magnitude of 
the cost and that of the expected liability cost arising from tolerating the manipulation, the auditor decides 
whether to require an adjustment or not. From the firm’s perspective, this outcome of the auditor’s 
adjustment decision is stochastic. Considering the chance of a required adjustment, the firm chooses the 
extent of an upward or downward manipulation to balance the benefit and cost of misreporting. If the 
auditor tolerates the manipulation, the managed earnings are reported to the public. If he requires an 
adjustment, the manipulation is reversed. So is the firm’s cost of misreporting because it captures the 
opportunity cost (or benefit) of “borrowing from (or saving for) the future.” The earnings reported to the 
                                                   
5 See section 2 and related discussions in McCracken et al. (2008), Gibbins et al. (2001), and Beattie et al. 
(2004) for explanations about the adjustment requirement cost borne by the auditor.   
 
  4 
public are then the unmanaged earnings. 
In reality, an auditor influences the earnings reported to the public through a complicated auditor-client 
negotiation process (see, e.g., Perreault and Kida 2011, Bame-Aldred and Kida 2007, Beattie et al. 2004, 
and Gibbins et al. 2001). Modeling this process in an elaborated manner requires a separate paper. The 
moderate goal here is to use a tractable “take-it-or-leave-it” game to capture only the first-order impact of 
the auditor-client negotiation. All models are wrong, but some are useful (Box and Draper 1987 and Box 
1976). The ability to accommodate the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions suggests that 
this stylized formulation of the auditor-client negotiation process is useful. 
 The paper has two main contributions. First, it offers a unified explanation to two puzzling features 
of the earnings triplet distributions. Second, the model provides a theoretical foundation for using the 
optimal manipulation characterized here as an alternative measure of earnings management distinct from 
but complementary to the commonly used measure based on the abnormal accruals model (see the 
discussion in section 6 for details).  
A recent study by Gerakos and Kovrijnykh (2013) has derived another measure of earnings 
management based on income smoothing, which is similar to the cookie-jar earnings management 
emphasized here. They find that the unmanaged earnings inverted from their model have higher volatility 
than reported earnings, which is consistent with the implication of my model. Their model has no auditor-
required adjustment and cannot provide related insights like the mixture hypothesis, which is tied to the 
important role of auditor in the corporate reporting process. Neither have they pointed out the perplexing 
volcano shape of the earnings triplet distributions. Moreover, the proportional misreporting rule assumed by 
them is not likely to be capable of explaining the volcano shape and the discontinuity at the same time. 
They also assume that the unmanaged earnings are persistent, which is not required in my model. However, 
their model captures not only accounting-based earnings management but also real earnings management, 
which is more general than the model here.    
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model setup. In section 3, 
I provide a general characterization of the optimal misreporting strategy, which is unique under some mild 
conditions. In section 4, two (effectively four) closed-form solutions are derived for particular functional 
form assumptions. Section 5 presents the results of two simulation exercises demonstrating the model’s 
capability of generating the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions. Potential applications 
of the model and other concluding remarks are discussed in section 6. Maximum likelihood and nonlinear 
least squares methods to estimate the model parameters are discussed in appendix A. Appendix B suggests 
a few ways to extend the model, such as allowing analyst forecast dispersion to play a role. Technical 
proofs are relegated to appendix C (available upon request).  
2. Model Setup 
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In the model, a firm needs to prepare the earnings figure for audit before announcing it to the public. 
The firm generally has an interest to manipulate the figure away from the unmanaged earnings denoted by 
y. The interest is affected by some earnings benchmark denoted by z, which is common knowledge in the 
model. Real-world examples of earnings benchmarks include the profit/loss cutoff at zero, last year’s 
earnings highlighting earnings increase/decrease, and the analyst consensus forecast reflecting market 
expectation (see section 3.1.5 of Dechow et al. 2010). In circumstances where a firm’s accounting choices 
are heavily influenced by certain executives, earnings benchmarks can be some internal yardsticks used for 
performance evaluation related to salary increases, bonuses, promotion, etc. One of the key insights of this 
paper is that the widely documented discontinuity phenomenon could be partly due to a steep but 
continuous increase in the density of the earnings distribution. Therefore, I will specify a payoff function of 
the firm that is smooth even at the earnings benchmark. This specification sets the model apart from others 
(e.g., Degeorge et al. 1999) that rely on a jump (e.g., a lump-sum bonus) to generate a discontinuity in the 
distribution of reported earnings.  
The earnings figure prepared for audit may include manipulation that nonetheless is not outright fraud. 
Let a ∈ (–∞,∞) denote such manipulation. The auditor either learns y and a during the audit that allows 
unrestricted access to the firm’s accounting system, or in equilibrium can infer them from the pre-audit 
earnings (or managed earnings), denoted by m = y + a, provided to him for audit. The closed-form 
solutions derived in section 4 are examples of such cases where m maps into y uniquely; hence the optimal 
a can be inferred by the auditor in equilibrium.  
In the very beginning of the model, the auditor explains the audit plan to the firm. The quality level q 
∈ [0,1] of the audit is known to the firm at that time before the firm sees the unmanaged earnings y and 
accordingly selects the manipulation a. Denote by εq + ε1–q the total amount of unintentional errors 
contained in y.  By definition, the firm is unaware of these errors. The components εq ~ Normal(0, qσu
2) 
and ε1–q ~ Normal(0, (1–q)σu
2) are independent random variables, with the parameter σu > 0. The part of 
unintentional errors discovered and removed by the auditor is εq, with ε1–q remaining in y even after the 
audit. For ease of exposition, q is treated as an exogenous parameter in this paper. Endogenizing it does not 
critically affect the main results. (I discuss how it can be endogenized in appendix B.) Excluding 
unintentional errors from the model does not qualitatively change the results either. However, their 
inclusion helps to understand the model’s implications; for example, it allows one to see the effect of the 
quality parameter q, which is interesting.  
Let x ∈ {0,1} denote the auditor’s adjustment decision, with 0 standing for no adjustment required and 
1 otherwise. Requiring an adjustment to remove the manipulation is not as simple as just saying no. To 
achieve the objective, the auditor must bear a cost, X ∈ [0,∞), privately known to him. Field studies (e.g., 
McCracken et al. 2008) have documented the stress auditors face and the effort they make during the 
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negotiation process to convince client firms to make adjustments, while not jeopardizing the relationship 
and the likelihood of being retained as the auditors. Such a process can take weeks, or even months, to 
finish (Gibbins et al. 2001), potentially distracting the auditors from concentrating on other work like the 
audits of other clients. Preparation work such as producing sufficient literature research to back up the 
adjustment requirement, gathering evidence of similar practices by other companies, securing the support 
from the national office, or even obtaining a second opinion from another audit firm also contributes to the 
cost of requiring an adjustment. Alternatively, the cost may be viewed as a parsimonious way to model 
whether the auditor’s personality is closer to a crusader type (who never tolerates any manipulation), as 
opposed to an accommodator type (who is prepared to bend the rules to interpret a manipulation as 
complying with GAAP).6  
The cost X is modeled as a random variable independent of εq and ε1–q. It follows a probability 
distribution G(l) = Pr{X ≤ l} with a differentiable probability density g(l) = G′(l) > 0 for all l > 0. The 
hazard rate function h(l) = [1–G(l)]/g(l) is therefore also differentiable. To ensure that the firm’s objective 
function (to be specified shortly) is twice-differentiable in a, I assume the existence of bounded limits liml↓0 
l½g(l) and liml↓0 [g(l) + 2lg′(l)]. This is a mild condition satisfied by a number of distributions including 
those discussed in section 4. The auditor learns the realized value of X just before making the adjustment 
decision. The firm knows only the distributional properties of X without observing the realized value. 
The expected liability cost to the auditor is assumed to be a quadratic function of the extent of the 
manipulation: L = ka2/2, where k > 0. (Any expected liability cost that might arise from failing to remove 
all the unintentional errors is irrelevant to the auditor’s adjustment decision and need not be specified.) The 
optimal adjustment decision, x*(a), is determined by minimizing the sum of the expected liability cost and 
the cost of requiring an adjustment:  
Min x∈{0,1}  (1–x)L + x(X).  
Clearly, x*(a) = 1{X ≤ L}, i.e., equal to 1 when the event {X ≤ L} holds and 0 otherwise. In other words, the 
auditor will require an adjustment if and only if the cost of doing so is not higher than the expected liability 
cost from tolerating the manipulation.  
The firm’s manipulation incentive is driven by the benefit and cost of misreporting (see Jiambalvo 
1996 and Marquardt and Wiedman 2004 for discussions on the benefits and costs). Because I focus on 
cookie-jar earnings management, a dollar of downward manipulation today helps build up the cookie-jar 
reserve, facilitating future upward manipulations. Similarly, every dollar of upward manipulation today is 
essentially borrowed from the future. Hence, if in the absence of distortions and discounting, the cost of 
                                                   
6 Beattie et al. (2004) identify six types of auditor personality with the crusader and accommodator types as the 
two extremes observed in their field study.  
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misreporting can be as simple as c(a) = a. Allowing for discounting and potential distortions (e.g., a small 
psychic cost of misreporting), I assume a more general c(a) with the requirements that c(0) = 0, lima↑∞ c(a) 
= ∞, c′(a) > 0 with c′(0) = c0 < ∞, and c″(a) ≥ 0.
7 The monotonicity assumption, c′(a) > 0, is a departure 
from the usual specification of a quadratic misreporting cost function (e.g., Guttman et al. 2006 and Fischer 
and Verrecchia 2000). The assumption is essential for deriving downward manipulations in the model. I 
will elaborate on this further shortly.  
The firm benefits more from reporting earnings that exceed the earnings benchmark to a greater extent 
and bears more negative consequences from missing the benchmark more. This is captured by a negative 
exponential benefit function. If the auditor does not require an adjustment to remove the manipulation a, 
the net benefit to the firm is  
( )
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where α > 0, with the limit case of α = 0 accommodating a linear benefit function. If an adjustment is 
required, a is reversed. So is c(a), which captures the opportunity cost (or benefit) of “borrowing from (or 
saving for)” the future. Accordingly, the net benefit to the firm is simply [1 – exp(–α[y – εq – z])]/α, as 
though there was no manipulation attempt.    
To reduce notation complexity, I will simply write x*(a) as x to denote the binary random variable 
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are referred to as the post-audit earnings (or reported earnings) defined as follows: 
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which can be simplified as  
                                                   
7 Although the model technically is a single-period model, it should be viewed as modeling a representative 
period of an infinite-period setting, rather than as a one-shot model. The misreporting cost in this reduced-form 
representation of an infinite-period setting plays a role analogous to the next-period value function in a Bellman 
equation for dynamic programming. Such a value function is endogenously determined in a Bellman equation but the 
misreporting cost in the reduced-form representation here is exogenously specified. The reduced-form representation 
could be formulated as a two-period model like some others in the literature. Such two-period models typically 
assume that the manipulation in the first period must be reversed in the second period, effectively turning the two-
period choices of manipulation into a one-period choice. Therefore, the difference between the two formulations is 
not as big as they appear. The representative-period formulation, however, seems to be more consistent with the 
going-concern perspective of accounting.  
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Note that the parameter b defined above summarizes the impacts of the quality parameter q and the 
deviation of y from z on the firm’s misreporting incentive. For ease of reference, I simply call b the 
marginal expected benefit of manipulation, although strictly speaking it is only one of the contributing 
factors.  
The firm can control a but not εq. When εq is more uncertain as a result of a higher quality level q, it 
raises b for any given levels of y – z and a. Consequently, the slope of the expected net benefit function 
changes, providing a different incentive to manipulate earnings. Likewise, a different benchmark z can also 
change the incentive.  
Whether the optimal manipulation is upward or downward also depends on the marginal cost of 
manipulation, c′(a), relative to the marginal benefit affected by b. If c(a) were assumed to be quadratic as in 
other earnings management models, c′(a) would be negative for a < 0. Downward manipulation would 
never constitute an equilibrium. Therefore, the assumption of c′(a) > 0 is critical for accommodating both 
upward and downward manipulations. Given that cookie-jar accounting is an important regulatory concern, 
it is interesting to explore the implications of this alternative assumption that captures the idea of “saving 
for the future.”   
I end this section with table 1 that summarizes the notations used and the timeline in figure 1 that 
summarizes the sequence of events in the model.  
3. Optimal Misreporting Strategy 
This section gives a general characterization of the optimal manipulation. In the next section, closed-
form solutions for particular adjustment requirement cost distribution and misreporting cost functions are 
derived. Then in section 5 the solutions are used to conduct two simulation exercises to see how well, or 
not so well, the model is able to accommodate the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions.   
Central to the characterization of the optimal manipulation is a cutoff point y0 given by the equation 
exp[–α(y – z) + α2σu
2q/2] = c0. That is to say, y0 ≡ z – (lnc0)/α + ασu
2q/2. This cutoff point of the 
                                                   
8 E[ [1 – 1{X ≤ L}][[1 – exp(–α[y + a – εq – z])]/α – c(a)] + 1{X ≤ L}[1 – exp(–α[y – εq – z])]/α ] 
= E[1 – exp(–α[y – εq – z])]/α + E[1 – 1{X ≤ L}] E[ exp(–α[y – εq – z])[1 – exp(–αa)]/α – c(a) ] 
= (1 – b)/α + [1 – G(L)][ b[1 – exp(–αa)]/α – c(a) ], 
where b = E[exp(–α[y – z – εq])] = exp[–α(y – z) + α
2
σu
2q/2]. The first equality above uses the assumption that X and 
εq are independent, and the second utilizes the normality assumption on εq.  
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unmanaged earnings determines whether the optimal manipulation is upward or downward. The 
proposition stated below proves the existence of the optimal misreporting strategy and characterizes it with 
several equality and inequality conditions.  
Proposition 1 (Existence and Characterization of Optimal Misreporting Strategy):  Let b = exp[–α(y 
– z) + α2σu
2q/2] and y0 = z – (lnc0)/α + ασu
2q/2. An optimal manipulation of the firm, denoted by a*, exists 
and satisfies  
(POS)   b[1 – exp(–αa)]/α – c(a) ≥ 0,  
which defines a convex set of a, denoted by Φ. Moreover,  
(i) a* is a solution of the following equation:  
(FOC)    [1–G(L)][ bexp(–αa) – c′(a) ] = kag(L)[ b[1 – exp(–αa)]/α – c(a) ],  
where L ≡ ka2/2; 
(ii) a* satisfies the following inequality:    
(SOC)   [1 – G(L)][ αbexp(–αa) + c″(a) ]  
+ k[ g(L) + 2Lg′(L) + 4Lg(L)2/(1 – G(L)) ][ b[1 – exp(–αa)]/α – c(a) ] ≥ 0;  
(iii) unless y = y0, zero manipulation (i.e., a = 0) is suboptimal;  
(iv) for y > y0, any optimal manipulation is downward (i.e., a
* < 0); for y < y0, any optimal manipulation is 
upward (i.e., a* > 0). 
For a manipulation to be optimal, the v for a > 0 minus the v for a = 0 must be non-negative, i.e., the 
manipulation must bring a non-negative gain to the firm. Since [1 – G(L)] > 0, the non-negativity 
requirement is simply condition POS. The equality first-order condition FOC can pin down candidates of 
optimal manipulation, of which some are actually suboptimal. The second-order condition SOC can 
differentiate between them but oftentimes condition POS can do so more conveniently. The last two parts of 
the proposition highlight a very simple structure of the optimal manipulation: Downward manipulation is 
optimal when the unmanaged earnings are sufficiently high (i.e., y > y0); otherwise, upward manipulation is 
optimal. This result can provide the force to turn normally distributed unmanaged earnings into a volcano-
shaped distribution of post-audit earnings. I will explain this further in section 5. 
The next result stated below establishes the uniqueness of the optimal manipulation. Other earnings 
management models often use a signaling approach, leading to multiple equilibria. This limits the potential 
of using such models to guide structural estimation in empirical studies because it is not clear which of the 
equilibria is observed in data.9 In contrast, the uniqueness result in the next proposition removes such 
                                                   
9 One can choose to focus only on the linear equilibrium when linking signaling-based earnings management 
models to data. In fact, this is typically the only equilibrium analyzed for such models, as a way to get around the 
intractability of analyzing all the multiple equilibria. The linear equilibrium specifies a rational price conjecture under 
which the share price is an affine function of the reported earnings. Although this equilibrium appears to be simplest 
and most intuitive, taking it to data causes some technical complications. For example, the reported earnings in 
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ambiguity when linking the model of this paper to data.  
Proposition 2 (Uniqueness of Optimal Misreporting Strategy):  Suppose 1 + 2l[dlng(l)/dl] – 4l[dln(1 
– G(l))/dl] ≥ 0 (e.g., if dlng(l)/dl ≥ –1), or equivalently, dln[h(l)(1 – G(l))]/dl ≤ 1/2l (e.g., if h′(l) ≤ 0). Then 
any manipulation satisfying conditions FOC and POS also satisfies condition SOC with strict inequality. 
Consequently, the firm has a unique optimal manipulation a* fully characterized by conditions FOC and 
POS.    
The proof of this proposition shows that under the conditions on the adjustment requirement cost 
distribution specified in the proposition, conditions FOC and POS can pin down the unique optimal 
manipulation. This approach offers the way to derive the closed-form solutions given in the next section.  
4. Closed-Form Solutions 
I begin with the following lemma showing that several families of the adjustment requirement cost 
distribution can ensure the uniqueness of the optimal manipulation.  
Lemma 1 (Distributions Ensuring Unique Optimal Misreporting Strategy):  Suppose that the 
adjustment requirement cost distribution belongs to the following families:    
(i) Weibull distribution with λ > 0 and θ > 0, i.e., g(l) = θλθlθ–1exp[–(λl)θ] with 1 – G(l) = exp[–(λl)θ] and 
h(l) = l1–θ/θλθ, provided that θ ≥ ½ (including Exponential when θ = 1); 
(ii) Gompertz distribution with λ > 0 and θ > 0, i.e., g(l) = λθexp(λl)exp(–θ[exp(λl) – 1]) with 1 – G(l) = 
exp(–θ[exp(λl) – 1]) and h(l) = exp(–λl)/λθ;  
(iii) Pareto Type II distribution with λ > 0 and θ > 0, i.e., g(l) = (θ/λ)[λ/(λ + l)]θ+1 with 1 – G(l) = [λ/(λ + l)]θ 
and h(l) = (λ + l)/θ, provided that θ ≥ ½.  
Then the firm has a unique optimal manipulation a*.  
I derive two closed-form solutions under the assumptions of an exponential and a linear misreporting 
cost function, respectively. This effectively provides two more, with the additional ones corresponding to 
hybid misreporting cost functions combined from the exponential and linear functions. Before elaborating 
on this further, let me first present the more specific form of condition FOC under the assumption of a 
Weibull adjustment requirement cost distribution with θ = ½.10 This proves to be a useful assumption that 
greatly simplifies the first-order condition and allows the solution to be expressed in closed form.     
                                                                                                                                                                    
principle can take an arbitrarily large positive or negative value, e.g., as a realization from a normal distribution. 
However, the share price cannot be negative. Therefore, the linear rational price conjecture cannot be well-defined 
for all possible values of the reported earnings if the distribution of earnings has the real line as the support, which 
seems very reasonable. In contrast, the model of this paper does not run into such a complication.  
 
10 Though not popular in accounting studies, the Weibull distribution is one of the most commonly used 
distributions in the area of reliability in engineering. The distribution is a member of the exponential family. Other 
members of the family include familiar distributions such as normal, exponential, gamma, chi-squared, beta, 
binomial, and Poisson.    
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Corollary 1 (First-Order Condition with Weibull Adjustment Requirement Cost Distribution):  
Suppose the distribution of the auditor’s adjustment requirement cost is Weibull with λ > 0 and θ = ½. Let η 
= (kλ/2)½, which is a parameter capturing the relative importance of the expected liability cost and 
adjustment requirement cost to the auditor. Moreover, let b = exp[–α(y – z) + α2σu
2q/2], y0 = z – (lnc0)/α + 
ασu
2q/2, and Φ be the convex set of a defined by condition POS. Then  
(i) for y > y0 (i.e., b < c0), the optimal manipulation is downward (i.e., a
* < 0) and uniquely determined by   
exp(αa)[ c′(a) + ηc(a) – (η/α)b ] = (1 – η/α)b  for a ∈ Φ;   
(ii) for y < y0 (i.e., b > c0), the optimal manipulation is upward (i.e., a
* > 0) and uniquely determined by 
exp(αa)[ c′(a) – ηc(a) + (η/α)b ] = (1 + η/α)b  for a ∈ Φ;  
(iii) for y = y0 (i.e., b = c0), the optimal manipulation is zero manipulation (i.e., a
* = 0), which solves both 
of the conditions above regardless of η.  
As mentioned, the cutoff point y0 plays an important role in dividing the model into two separate 
regions. This is reflected in the two parts of the simplified condition FOC stated in the corollary above, 
with the dividing point at y0 fitting either part. An important implication of this structure is that if two 
misreporting cost functions are identical on one side of the cutoff point, the optimal manipulation must be 
identical as well for that side. So when the closed-form solutions for an exponential and a linear 
misreporting cost function are derived, a mix-and-match of them yields the closed-form solutions for some 
hybrid misreporting cost functions. These functions are referred to as “left-linear, right-exponential” 
(LLRE) and “left-exponential, right-linear” (LERL) functions, with a = 0 that corresponds to y = y0 as the 
dividing point: 
(LLRE)  c(a) = c0a for a < 0; c(a) = (c0/γ)[exp(γa) – 1], with γ > 0, for a ≥ 0    
(LERL)  c(a) = (c0/γ)[exp(γa) – 1], with γ > 0, for a < 0; c(a) = c0a for a ≥ 0. 
 Using the simplified condition FOC in Corollary 1, I am able to derive the closed-form solutions 
given in the next two propositions.  
Proposition 3 (Solution with Exponential Misreporting Cost and Weibull Adjustment Requirement 
Cost Distribution):  Suppose the firm’s cost of misreporting is exponential, i.e., c(a) = (c0/γ)[exp(γa) – 1] 
with γ > 0, and the distribution of the auditor’s adjustment requirement cost is Weibull with λ > 0 and θ = 
½. Let η = (kλ/2)½. Moreover, let b = exp[–α(y – z) + α2σu
2q/2] and y0 = z – (lnc0)/α + ασu
2q/2. Then the 
optimal manipulation a* is given as follows:  
(i) For η = α, if y ≥ y0 (i.e., b ≤ c0), a
* = (1/α)ln( [(b/c0) + (α/γ)]/[1 + (α/γ)] ).  
(ii) For η = γ, if y ≤ y0 (i.e., b ≥ c0), a
* = (1/α)ln( [1 + (α/γ)]/[1 + (c0/b)(α/γ)] ).  
(iii) For α = γ, if y ≥ y0 (i.e., b ≤ c0),  
a* = (1/α)ln( [ (1 + b/c0) + {(1 – b/c0)
2 + 4(α/η)2(b/c0)}
½ ] / 2(α/η + 1) );  
if y ≤ y0 (i.e., b ≥ c0),  
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a* = (1/α)ln( [ {(1 – b/c0)
2 + 4(α/η)2(b/c0)}
½ – (1 + b/c0) ] / 2(α/η – 1) )  
for η ≠ α, and a* = (1/α)ln[2b/(c0 + b)] for η = α.  
Parts (i) and (ii) of the proposition consider the optimal manipulation for specific cases with η = α or η 
= γ. Under these cases, the first-order conditions for the relevant regions take a linear form. Solving out a* 
in closed form for those regions is thus trivial.  
The closed-form solution given in part (iii), with α = γ, comes from a quadratic equation that 
conveniently arises under this case for an exponential misreporting cost function assumed. The proof 
involves considering multiple cases to ensure that the optimal manipulation is well-defined even for certain 
parameter values that appear to result in an ill-defined first-order condition.  
Proposition 4 (Solution with Linear Misreporting Cost and Weibull Adjustment Requirement Cost 
Distribution):  Suppose the firm’s cost of misreporting is linear, i.e., c(a) = c0a, and the distribution of the 
auditor’s adjustment requirement cost is Weibull with λ > 0 and θ = ½. Let η = (kλ/2)½. Moreover, let b = 
exp[–α(y – z) + α2σu
2q/2] and y0 = z – (lnc0)/α + ασu
2q/2. Then the optimal manipulation a* is given as 
follows:  
(i) For y ≥ y0 (i.e., b ≤ c0), 
  a* = (1/α){ (b/c0) – (α/η) + W0( (α/η – 1)exp(α/η)(b/c0)exp(–b/c0) ) };  
(ii) for y ≤ y0 (i.e., b ≥ c0),  
 a* = (1/α){ (b/c0) + (α/η) + W–1( –(α/η + 1)exp(–α/η)(b/c0)exp(–b/c0) ) },  
where W0 and W–1, with W0 ≥ –1 ≥ W–1, are the single-valued upper and lower segments of the real branch 
of the Lambert W function defined on the domains [–exp(–1),∞) and [–exp(–1),0], respectively.   
The linear misreporting cost function considered in this proposition leads to a simple form of the first-
order condition. It has a closed-form solution that can be expressed in terms of the Lambert W function. 
This special function is defined as the (multi-valued) inverse of the function f(W) = Wexp(W). The real 
branch of the function has an upper and a lower (single-valued) segment, denoted by W0 and W–1, defined 
on the domains [–exp(–1),∞) and [–exp(–1),0], respectively, with W0 ≥ –1 ≥ W–1. Figure 2 shows the shape 
of the function. The figure is adopted from Corless et al. (1996) that reviews the function and further 
develops its properties, making it more widely known than before. However, work related to the function 
dates back to Johann Lambert (1728-1777) and Leonhard Euler (1707-1783) (Brito et al. 2008).11  
                                                   
11 The Lambert W function finds its role in many fields including mathematics (e.g., combinatorial number 
theory), computer science (e.g., algorithm and data structures), statistics (e.g., generalized skewed distributions and 
risk estimation), engineering (e.g., combustion, fuel consumption, and time-delayed systems), geology (e.g., 
earthquake forecasting), population ecology (e.g., Lotka-Volterra equations for population growth), health science 
(e.g., epidemic models), chemistry (e.g., enzyme kinetics), and especially physics (e.g., electrostatics, statistical 
mechanics, general relativity, inflationary cosmology, radiative transfer, and quantum chromodynamics) (Goerg 
2011, Brito et al. 2008, Scott et al. 2006, and Corless et al. 1996). A decade ago, an “editorial in Focus, the 
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The shape of the Lambert W function gives a special touch to the optimal manipulation. It can result in 
a rather drastic change in the density around the cutoff point y0 in the earnings triplet distributions. This 
provides a continuous explanation to the discontinuity in histogram documented in the literature (e.g., 
Burgstahler and Dichev 1997 and Degeorge et al. 1999). I will elaborate on this further in section 5 where 
two simulation exercises based on solutions involving the Lambert W function are discussed.    
Figure 3a illustrates the closed-form solution of the optimal manipulation (a*) in Proposition 4 based 
on the Lambert W function, alongside with the marginal expected benefit of manipulation (b), both as 
functions of the unmanaged earnings y. In figure 3b, the optimal manipulation is added to the unmanaged 
earnings to depict the pre-audit earnings m = y + a* as a function of the unmanaged earnings. The shaded 
areas in the figure indicate the optimal manipulations that constitute the pre-audit earnings.     
I end this section with the following result that shows the one-to-one mapping from the pre-audit 
earnings m back into the unmanaged earnings y. Holding for the two (effectively four) closed-form 
solutions, this result provides a hope to derive conditions under which such a one-to-one inverse mapping 
exists generally. The challenge is left for future research.    
Proposition 5 (Invertibility of Pre-audit Earnings to Unmanaged Earnings):  Suppose the distribution 
of the auditor’s adjustment requirement cost is Weibull with λ > 0 and θ = ½. Let η = (kλ/2)½ and µ = exp( –
α(m – z) + α2σu
2q/2 )/c0. Then the unmanaged earnings y are below (above) y0 = z – (lnc0)/α + ασu
2q/2 if 
and only if the pre-audit earnings m = y + a* are below (above) y0. Moreover, the auditor can infer y from 
m using the relation y = Y(µ), with Y defined as follows:  
(i) If the firm’s cost of misreporting is exponential with γ = α, i.e., c(a) = (c0/α)[exp(αa) – 1],   
 Y(µ) ≡ z + ασu
2q/2 – (1/α)ln[ c0[µ + (α/η – 1)µ
2]/(α/η + 1 – µ) ]   for m ≥ y0 (i.e., µ ≤ 1)   
 Y(µ) ≡ z + ασu
2q/2 – (1/α)ln[ c0[(α/η + 1)µ
2 – µ]/(α/η – 1 + µ) ]   for m ≤ y0 (i.e., µ ≥ 1); 
(ii) if the firm’s cost of misreporting is linear, i.e., c(a) = c0a,   
Y(µ) = z + ασu
2q/2 – (1/α)ln[ –c0W0( –exp(–α/η)µexp[(α/η – 1)µ] ) ]  for m ≥ y0 (i.e., µ ≤ 1)   
 Y(µ) = z + ασu
2q/2 – (1/α)ln[ –c0W–1( –exp(α/η)µexp[–(α/η + 1)µ] ) ]  for m ≤ y0 (i.e., µ ≥ 1).  
The unmanaged earnings y = Y(µ) are continuous and strictly increasing in the pre-audit earnings m ∈ (–
∞,∞).  
In the next section, I present the results of two simulation exercises based on the model. The analysis 
helps to assess the limit and the potential of the model as a framework for guiding empirical research.  
5. Empirical Contents of the Model 
                                                                                                                                                                    
newsletter of the Mathematical Association of America, asked: ‘Time for a new elementary function?’,” suggesting 
that the usefulness of the function in diverse fields qualifies it to be considered a candidate member of elementary 
functions, like the familiar sin, cosine, logarithm, exponential, etc (Hayes 2005).  
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Before presenting the simulation results in subsections 5.2 and 5.3, I first briefly explain why the 
model should be capable of accommodating the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions.  
5.1 Why the Model Can Accommodate the Puzzling Features  
To elucidate how the model can lead to a phenomenon similar to the discontinuity documented in the 
literature, I plot the distribution of unmanaged earnings, y, in figure 4a and superimpose on it the 
distribution of pre-audit earnings, m. In the figure, the unmanaged earnings are assumed to follow a normal 
distribution. Only the left side of the density line (in gray) appears in the plot given the scale chosen. The 
earnings benchmark z is marked by the vertical solid line (in black). It is assumed to be 0.02, rather than 
zero, to highlight that the model does not require the earnings benchmark to be equal to zero.  
The vertical dash line (in green) indicates the location of the cutoff point y0 (assumed to be 0.06), 
which divides the two directions of earnings manipulation. Unmanaged earnings below y0 are manipulated 
upward, pushing the density line to the right toward the cutoff point. Similarly, the density line on the right 
of y0 is pushed to the left toward the point. Mathematically, this one-to-one remapping of the density of 
unmanaged earnings into the “density” of pre-audit earnings is straightforward and represented by the thin 
solid curve (in black). However, the area under this curve need not add up to one. To ensure that the 
remapped density meets the “sum to one” requirement of probability theory, the thin solid curve is 
multiplied by a normalizing factor to obtain the density line of pre-audit earnings. This is represented by the 
thick solid curve (in blue). 
Figure 4a assumes that the firm’s misreporting cost function is linear. Consequently, the optimal 
manipulation can be solved in terms of the Lambert W function. The shape of this function leads to a 
particularly steep slope around y0. A zoom-in view of that part of the density lines (surrounded by red 
dotted rectangles) is provided on the left side of the figure.  
Imagine that the probability distribution of pre-audit earnings described by the model is sampled, with 
the distribution of observations plotted in histogram form. Because of the steep slope around y0, it is likely 
to see a sharp difference between the frequencies observed in the immediate left and right bins next to the 
cutoff point. A “discontinuity” similar to those documented in the literature can thus arise in the continuous 
model of this paper. Several issues however should be kept in mind before concluding that the model can 
accommodate the discontinuity phenomenon.              
First, the documented discontinuity occurs at zero in the distributions of earnings, earnings change, 
and earnings surprise. For the model to explain the phenomenon, y0 must be close to the earnings 
benchmark in concern, be it the profit/loss cutoff, earnings increase/decrease, or beating/missing an 
earnings forecast. This proximity between y0 and z is assumed in figure 4a and in the simulation exercises. 
Whether it is so in reality is an open question that may be answered empirically. I discuss the estimation of 
the model parameters in appendix A.  
Second, figure 4a only shows a “discontinuity” in the distribution of pre-audit earnings, which are not 
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exactly the same as the reported earnings in audited financial statements. I therefore conduct the two 
simulation exercises to fill the gap between these earnings concepts.  
Third, the documented discontinuity is not about the distribution of earnings from the same firm 
observed multiple times. Instead, the earnings concerned in the literature come from different firms. Thus, 
they are likely to be drawn from different distributions, rather than from a single distribution assumed in 
figure 4a. The simulation exercises make an attempt to address this issue.         
Figure 4b illustrates that even when the unmanaged earnings are distributed normally, the distribution 
of pre-audit earnings may have a volcano shape with the peak sharper than that of a bell-shaped normal 
distribution. This may occur if y0 is located around the peak of the unmanaged earnings distribution, with 
the left and right sides of the density line pushed toward the peak strongly. For example, imagine that the 
expected liability cost is low and the adjustment requirement cost tends to be high. So the auditor is 
reluctant to require an adjustment. The firm will have a strong incentive to manipulate earnings, resulting in 
a big push of the density line toward the middle and hence a volcano-shaped distribution of pre-audit 
earnings.  
Before presenting the simulation results in the next two subsections, let me first introduce some 
terminology. Recall that the audit will remove some of the unintentional errors, namely εq, before the firm 
publicly announces the post-audit earnings r = xy + (1 – x)m – εq. Without an auditor-required adjustment 
(i.e., x = 0), r is simply the pre-audit earnings m corrected for the discovered unintentional errors. If an 
adjustment is required (i.e., x = 1), r is the unmanaged earnings y corrected for the discovered unintentional 
errors.  
The first simulation exercise focuses on the distribution of excess earnings, defined as the part of 
earnings exceeding the earnings benchmark z. (Negative excess earnings mean the part of earnings falling 
short of the benchmark.) Based on this definition, the post-audit excess earnings are  
δr = [xy + (1 – x)m – εq] – z. 
Similarly, the pre-audit and unmanaged excess earnings are m – z and y – z, respectively. If the analyst 
consensus forecast is taken as the earnings benchmark, post-audit excess earnings coincide with the concept 
of earnings surprise.  
To simulate the distribution of earnings change, I consider a simple repetition of the model for two 
periods. This yields some interesting results. However, one needs to bear in mind a caveat. Repeating the 
model for multiple periods does not give a truly dynamic model. In a dynamic model, care must be taken to 
consider the accumulation of past earnings manipulations in the total assets (see, e.g., Barton & Simko 
2002 and Baber et al. 2011), which might enhance the auditor’s incentive to require an adjustment in the 
future. Owing to the limited space here, the analysis of a truly dynamic version of the model is left for 
future research.    
Let r1 denote the lagged post-audit earnings, i.e., the post-audit earnings in the earlier period of a two-
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period repetition of the model. The second simulation exercise assumes that in the current period of the 
two-period repetition some firms use the profit/loss cutoff as the earnings benchmark (i.e., z = 0) while 
others use the earnings increase/decrease cutoff as the benchmark (i.e., z = r1). Because of this diversity in 
the benchmarks assumed, a discontinuity can occur in the distributions of earnings and earnings 
change/difference simultaneously. The post-audit earnings change is defined as   
∆r = [xy + (1 – x)m – εq] – r1. 
Similarly, the pre-audit and unmanaged earnings differences are defined as m – r1 and y – r1, respectively. 
For firms using lagged post-audit earnings as the benchmark, the post-audit earnings change is simply their 
excess earnings. However, for firms using zero earnings as the benchmark, the post-audit earnings change 
is not the same as excess earnings but the post-audit earnings are. 
5.2 Simulating a Volcano-shaped Distribution of Excess Earnings with a Sharp Peak 
Figure 5a visualizes the results of the first simulation with y0 – z = $0.011 and a linear misreporting 
cost function. The simulation assumes a population of firms each with possibly a different distribution of 
unmanaged earnings (per share in cents). For simplicity, the distributions are all normal with the same 
standard deviation but possibly different means. The means are themselves drawn from a normal 
distribution.  
I am interested in simulating the situation where earnings forecasts taken as the earnings benchmarks 
are equal to the means of the unmanaged earnings distribution. The purpose is to see how far the 
distribution of the simulated post-audit excess earnings can get close to its counterpart reported in figure 2 
of Bhojraj et al. (2009), which is included in figure 5b for ease of reference. Because this simulation is 
meant to be a first look at the empirical contents of the model, I do not consider the more complicated 
situation with the forecasts set to the post-audit earnings of an earlier period. The second simulation 
presented later will include such dynamic considerations.  
In figure 5a, the distributions of the pre-audit, post-audit, and unmanaged excess earnings are plotted 
in histogram form, with the latter overlaid on the former one after another. The bin width of the histogram 
is $0.01, to be consistent with the choice in Bhojraj et al. (2009). To provide a better angle in viewing the 
three distributions, a three-dimensional plot of the distributions is given in figure 5c. The shape of the 
Lambert W function that characterizes the optimal manipulation behind this simulation induces a huge 
spike in the frequency distribution of the pre-audit excess earnings (in yellow) in the back. This starkly 
differs from the nearly flat distribution of the unmanaged excess earnings (in gray) in the front. The 
stochastic nature of the adjustment decision, together with the correction for the discovered unintentional 
errors, mixes the two publicly unobservable distributions into the distribution of the post-audit excess 
earnings (in blue) in the middle, which is observable to the public.  
The especially sharp peak of the distribution of earnings surprise is a feature easily noticed in related 
studies (e.g., figure 6 of Degeorge et al. 1999 and figure 2 of Frankel et al. 2010). The simulation illustrates 
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how the model turns a rather flat distribution of unmanaged excess earnings (originating from normally 
distributed unmanaged earnings) into a dramatically different distribution of post-audit excess earnings. 
The assumption of y0 – z = $0.011 ensures that the sharp peak of the distribution occurs in the two right 
bins next to zero excess earnings. The solid stair-step line (in blue) in figure 5a outlines the distribution of 
the post-audit excess earnings partially hidden behind the distribution of unmanaged excess earnings in the 
front. The overall shape of the post-audit excess earnings distributions looks quite similar to its counterpart 
in figure 2 of Bhojraj et al. 2009, which however is fatter at the mid-level and has thinner tails. Given the 
simple structure of the model, compared to the complex reality it tries to approximate, such mismatches 
seem unsurprising.    
The following hypothesis summarizes the key insight from the first simulation. 
The Mixture Hypothesis:  The volcano-shaped distribution of earning surprise with a sharp peak 
documented in the literature is due to a mixture of a relatively flat distribution of unmanaged excess 
earnings with a spiky distribution of pre-audit excess earnings. 
5.3 Simulating a ‘Discontinuity’ in the Distributions of Earnings and Earnings Change 
Throughout the second simulation, I assume y0 – z = $0.015 and a “left-exponential, right-linear” 
(LERL) misreporting cost function (see section 4 for the definition). Assuming a linear misreporting cost 
function as in the first simulation would not change the results critically. However, the overall shapes of the 
simulated distributions would look less similar to their counterparts based on actual data.  
The first simulation directly assumes a distribution of unmanaged earnings per share (in cents). In 
contrast, the second simulation uses a more complicated procedure to simulate the distribution of 
unmanaged earnings based on the actual data of total assets in 1988-2006, assuming a relation between the 
unmanaged earnings and total assets. The distribution of unmanaged earnings per share is then computed 
using the actual shares outstanding data associated with the total assets data. I use this unmanaged earnings 
distribution as the “seed” for simulating the distribution of post-audit earnings for an earlier period, 
assuming zero earnings as the benchmark for manipulation. The earnings increase/decrease cutoff is not a 
choice at this point because there are no lagged post-audit earnings yet.  
After obtaining the post-audit earnings for the earlier period, they become the lagged post-audit 
earnings for the current period of the simulation. The beginning value of the total assets for the current 
period is updated from that of the earlier period using the simulated post-audit earnings, assuming a 75% 
payout ratio. The updated total assets are used as a basis to simulate the current period’s unmanaged 
earnings, assuming a relation augmented by some “natural growth.”  
There are three main sources for such “natural growth.” First, it can come from technological 
advancement that improves the productivity of any given asset base. Second, it can arise from an expansion 
of the asset base due to new investment opportunities discovered. (But this is not captured in the simple 
clean-surplus updating of the total assets assumed above.) Third, the earnings concerned in the literature are 
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in nominal value. Inflation can contribute to the “natural growth” of earnings even when the productivity is 
fixed and the asset base is constant.  
Allowing for some “natural growth” is important. Otherwise, the peak of the distribution of the 
simulated unmanaged earnings difference would not be so far to the right as in figure 7a. Consequently, the 
peak of the distribution of the simulated post-audit earnings change would be much sharper, unlike its 
counterpart in figure 7b based on actual earnings data in 1988-2006. It is important to keep in mind that the 
model of this paper does not explain the shape of the (unobservable) unmanaged earnings distributions. It 
only explains how the distribution may be transformed into the (observable) post-audit earnings with a 
distinctly different look. Therefore, the purpose of assuming some “natural growth” is to come up with 
something reasonably close to the reality and let the model explain the remaining difference, which 
otherwise is perplexing.  
With the unmanaged earnings for the current period simulated, the model then converts them into pre-
audit and post-audit earnings. Unlike in the first simulation, now firms can differ in the earnings 
benchmarks assumed: some use z = 0, while others use z = r1. For simplicity, I assign these two benchmarks 
randomly with 40% of the chance setting z = 0 and 60% setting z = r1. The distributions of the pre-audit, 
post-audit, and unmanaged earnings are plotted in figure 6a, with the latter overlaid on the former one after 
another. Again, the bin width of the histogram is $0.01. I use small solid circles (in blue) to outline the 
distribution of the post-audit earnings partially hidden behind the distribution of unmanaged earnings (in 
gray) in the front. Whenever the frequency of the post-audit earnings exceeds that of the unmanaged 
earnings, the exceeding part can be clearly seen as a blue bar segment on top of a gray histogram bar. The 
key difference between the distributions of the post-audit and unmanaged earnings is the higher frequencies 
in the several right bins next to zero earnings. A close-up view of that part (surrounded by red dotted 
rectangles) is provided on the left side of the figure. The distribution of the actual earnings in 1998-2006 is 
given in figure 6b for comparison.  
Figure 7a shows the distributions of the pre-audit earnings difference (in yellow) in the back, the post-
audit earnings change (in blue) in the middle, and the unmanaged earnings difference (in gray) in the front. 
Again, small solid circles (in blue) are used to outline the distribution of the post-audit earnings change 
partially hidden behind the distribution of the unmanaged earnings difference. Note that 40% of the 
simulated observations in the figure use z = 0 (rather than z = r1) as the benchmark for earnings 
manipulation. Still the remaining 60% are sufficient to induce the noticeably higher frequencies in the 
several right bins next to zero earnings change indicated by the solid vertical line (in black). The left side of 
the figure provides a zoom-in view for that part of the post-audit earnings change distribution (surrounded 
by red dotted rectangles).  
The key insight from the second simulation is summarized as the following hypothesis:  
The Continuous ‘Discontinuity’ Hypothesis:  The simultaneous existence of a “discontinuity” in 
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the distributions of earnings and earnings change documented in the literature is due to a continuous but 
drastic increase in the density of the distributions around the respective earnings benchmarks.   
6. Concluding Remarks 
The model of this paper can accommodate the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions, 
despite the simple representation of the auditor-client negotiation process as a “take-it-or-leave-it” game. 
Aside from some mismatches that seem unsurprising given the simple model structure, the simulation 
results demonstrate the model’s potential to capture the driving forces behind the two salient features.  
Two caveats for the simulation results are worth noting. In the second simulation, I assume for 
simplicity that firms stochastically choose the profit/loss or the earnings increase/decrease cutoffs as the 
benchmarks for manipulation. In unreported analysis, I also consider a behavioral model of benchmark 
selection based on the unmanaged earnings’ proximity to different benchmarks. The results are broadly 
similar. Because constructing such a selection model is not the focus of this paper, in the interest of space it 
is not reported here. However, endogenizing the benchmark selection is an interesting extension of the 
model.  
The second simulation also tries to be dynamic. But the model here is only “pseudo-dynamic,” i.e., it 
uses an exogenously specified misreporting cost function to represent in reduced form any future benefits 
and costs of the current-period manipulation. A truly dynamic version of the model requires carefully 
considering the connection between periods through a misreporting cost function endogenously determined 
in equilibrium.  
A major approach used in the literature to identify earnings management is the abnormal accruals 
model. It is an empirical model that defines the unexplained residuals of a linear regression model as 
measuring earnings management. The model has been used widely with success. However, owing to 
imperfections explained below, there remains room for alternative models to complement this major 
approach.  
While the linear regression in the abnormal accruals model is convenient, simple, and easy to 
understand, it seems quite unlikely that relations governing earnings management activities are indeed 
linear. This has an impact on the model because it defines anything not captured by the linear regression as 
abnormal accruals. Aside from this, any unrelated random noise affecting the total accruals are defined as 
part of the abnormal accruals. These imperfections suggest that a nonlinear model differentiating between 
random noise and earnings manipulation can complement the abnormal accruals model.  
The simulation results of this paper indicate that the nonlinear solutions involving the Lambert W 
function help explain the two salient features of the earnings triplet distributions, suggesting that the 
solutions capture some important aspects of the reality. Using the estimation procedures discussed in 
appendix A, one can obtain estimates of the model parameters that nonetheless would not fit the data 
perfectly. The unexplained residuals of the observed post-audit earnings are better viewed as the discovered 
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unintentional errors, rather than as part of the earnings manipulation. With the parameter estimates and the 
predicted post-audit earnings, one can use the model to infer the underlying pre-audit earnings and 
unmanaged earnings. The difference between the two provides an alternative measure of earnings 
manipulation that can complement the abnormal accruals measure.  
The model of this paper when interpreted strictly according to its intent also differs from the abnormal 
accruals model in terms of the type of earnings management captured. For firms making conservative or 
liberal accounting choices that nevertheless are reasonable and allowed under GAAP, if the effect is firm-
specific rather than common across many firms, it would be picked up by the abnormal accruals model as 
earnings management. In contrast, the model here focuses on earnings manipulation unacceptable under 
GAAP. Thus, for empirical studies that need to separate earnings manipulation from acceptable 
conservative/liberal accounting choices, the model here together with the abnormal accruals model can 
provide a distinction between the two types of earnings management activities.  
There are other potential applications of the model. I will mention three here. The first is to use the 
estimated model for policy analysis. In Heckman’s (2010) view, “[p]olicy analysis is all about identifying 
counterfactual states. Counterfactual policy states are possible outcomes in different hypothetical states of 
the world. … Causal comparisons entail contrasts between outcomes in alternative possible states holding 
factors other than the features of the policy being analyzed the same across the contrasts.” (p. 359) He 
further elaborates and says: “The goal of the structural econometrics literature, like the goal of all science, 
is to understand the causal mechanisms producing effects so that one can use empirical versions of models 
to forecast the effects of interventions never previously experienced, to calculate a variety of policy 
counterfactuals and to use theory to guide choices of estimators to interpret evidence and to cumulate 
evidence across studies.” (p. 361)  
By hypothesizing how regulation changes might affect certain model parameters (or the distribution of 
unmanaged earnings), one can use the model to predict the effect of the changes on earnings manipulation. 
This provides an assessment useful for comparing the anticipated effect to the implementation cost of a 
regulation change, helping regulators to make informed decisions.   
In addition, the model can be used as a framework for examining the effectiveness of certain corporate 
governance mechanisms in curbing earnings manipulation. For such mechanisms to be useful, they must 
change the model parameters related to the benefit and cost of misreporting (e.g., c0). By including 
corporate governance measures as explanatory variables in the estimation procedures, one can test whether 
the relevant parameters are sensitive to these variables. Conclusions can then be drawn on the effectiveness 
of the variables in discouraging earnings manipulation. 
Besides viewing the model from a positive perspective, it may be used as a framework for developing 
decision aids to help auditors improve adjustment decisions. In the model, the auditor is assumed to know 
all the parameters without doubt. In reality, this seems unlikely. Instead, auditors might have a subconscious 
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assessment of the factors corresponding to the model parameters and make decisions based on 
“professional judgment.” Less experienced auditors might misjudge and make mistakes against their own 
interest. With the decision made in a judgmental manner, even experienced auditors might make occasional 
mistakes due to subconscious psychological biases. Systematically collecting information useful for 
estimating the model parameters and developing a formal decision aid based on the model can raise the 
awareness of the auditors making adjustment decisions. By highlighting the strategic considerations in the 
model, the auditors can carefully balance such considerations with other unmodeled factors. The decision 
quality can thus be improved.  
References 
Baber, W.R., Kang, S.-H. & Li, Y., 2011. Modeling Discretionary Accrual Reversal and the Balance Sheet 
as an Earnings Management Constraint. The Accounting Review, 86(4), pp.1189–1212. 
Bame-Aldred, C.W. & Kida, T., 2007. A comparison of auditor and client initial negotiation positions and 
tactics. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 32(6), pp.497–511. 
Barton, J. & Simko, P.J., 2002. The Balance Sheet as an Earnings Management Constraint. The Accounting 
Review, 77, pp.1–27. 
Beattie, V., Fearnley, S. & Brandt, R., 2004. A Grounded Theory Model of Auditor-Client Negotiations. 
International Journal of Auditing, 8(1), pp.1–19. 
Beatty, A.L., Ke, B. & Petroni, K.R., 2002. Earnings management to avoid earnings declines across 
publicly and privately held banks. Accounting Review, 77(3), pp.547–570. 
Beaver, W.H., McNichols, M.F. & Nelson, K.K., 2007. An alternative interpretation of the discontinuity in 
earnings distributions. Review of Accounting Studies, 12(4), pp.525–556. 
Beaver, William H., McNichols, Maureen F. & Nelson, Karen K., 2003. Management of the loss reserve 
accrual and the distribution of earnings in the property-casualty insurance industry. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 35(3), pp.347–376. 
Bhojraj, S. et al., 2009. Making Sense of Cents: An Examination of Firms That Marginally Miss or Beat 
Analyst Forecasts. The Journal of Finance, 64(5), pp.2361–2388. 
Bollen, N.P.B. & Pool, V.K., 2009. Do Hedge Fund Managers Misreport Returns? Evidence from the 
Pooled Distribution. The Journal of Finance, 64(5), pp.2257–2288. 
Box, G.E.P., 1976. Science and Statistics. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 71(356), 
pp.791–799. 
Box, G.E.P. & Draper, N.R., 1987. Empirical model-building and response surfaces, Wiley. 
Brito, P.B., Fabiao, F. & Staubyn, A., 2008. Euler, Lambert, and the Lambert W-function today. The 
Mathematical Scientist, 33(2), pp.127–133. 
Brown, L.D. & Pinello, A.S., 2007. To What Extent Does the Financial Reporting Process Curb Earnings 
Surprise Games? Journal of Accounting Research, 45(5), pp.947–981. 
Burgstahler, D. & Dichev, I., 1997. Earnings management to avoid earnings decreases and losses. Journal 
of Accounting and Economics, 24(1), pp.99–126. 
Burns, N. & Kedia, S., 2006. The impact of performance-based compensation on misreporting. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 79(1), pp.35–67. 
  22 
Caramanis, C. & Lennox, C., 2008. Audit effort and earnings management. Journal of Accounting and 
Economics, 45(1), pp.116–138. 
Caskey, J., Nagar, V. & Petacchi, P., 2010. Reporting Bias with an Audit Committee. The Accounting 
Review, 85(2), pp.447–481. 
Cohen, D. et al., 2011. Warranty Reserve: Contingent Liability, Information Signal, or Earnings 
Management Tool? The Accounting Review, 86(2), pp.569–604. 
Corless, R.M. et al., 1996. On the Lambert W function. Advances in Computational Mathematics, 5(4), 
pp.329–359. 
Coulton, J., Taylor, Sarah & Taylor, Stephen, 2005. Is “benchmark beating” by Australian firms evidence of 
earnings management? Accounting & Finance, 45(4), pp.553–576. 
Daske, H., Gebhardt, G. & McLeay, S., 2006. The distribution of earnings relative to targets in the 
European Union. Accounting and Business Research, 36(3), pp.137–167. 
Dechow, P., Ge, W. & Schrand, C., 2010. Understanding earnings quality: A review of the proxies, their 
determinants and their consequences. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 50(2–3), pp.344–
401. 
Dechow, P., Richardson, S. & Tuna, I., 2003. Why Are Earnings Kinky? An Examination of the Earnings 
Management Explanation. Review of Accounting Studies, 8(2), pp.355–384. 
Degeorge, F., Patel, J. & Zeckhauser, R., 1999. Earnings management to exceed thresholds. Journal of 
Business, 72(1), pp.1–33. 
Durtschi, C. & Easton, P., 2009. Earnings management? erroneous inferences based on earnings frequency 
distributions. Journal of Accounting Research, 47(5), pp.1249–1281. 
Durtschi, C. & Easton, P., 2005. Earnings management? the shapes of the frequency distributions of 
earnings metrics are not evidence ipso facto. Journal of Accounting Research, 43(4), pp.557–592. 
Dyck, A., Morse, A. & Zingales, L., 2010. Who Blows the Whistle on Corporate Fraud? The Journal of 
Finance, 65(6), pp.2213–2253. 
Ewert, R. & Wagenhofer, A., 2005. Economic Effects of Tightening Accounting Standards to Restrict 
Earnings Management. The Accounting Review, 80(4), pp.1101–1124. 
Feng, M. et al., 2011. Why do CFOs become involved in material accounting manipulations? Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 51(1-2), pp.21–36. 
Fich, E.M. & Shivdasani, A., 2007. Financial fraud, director reputation, and shareholder wealth. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 86(2), pp.306–336. 
Fischer, P.E. & Verrecchia, R.E., 2000. Reporting Bias. The Accounting Review, 75(2), pp.229–245. 
Frankel, R., Mayew, W.J. & Sun, Y., 2010. Do pennies matter? Investor relations consequences of small 
negative   earnings surprises. Review of Accounting Studies, 15(1), pp.220–242. 
Gao, P., 2013. A measurement approach to conservatism and earnings management. Journal of Accounting 
and Economics, forthcoming. Available at: 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165410112000651 [Accessed March 1, 2013]. 
Gerakos, J. & Kovrijnykh, A., 2013. Performance Shocks and Misreporting, Rochester, NY: Social Science 
Research Network. Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=1546478 [Accessed March 1, 
2013]. 
Gibbins, M., Salterio, S. & Webb, A., 2001. Evidence About Auditor-Client Management Negotiation 
  23 
Concerning Client’s Financial Reporting. Journal of Accounting Research, 39(3), pp.535–563. 
Goerg, G.M., 2011. Lambert W Random Variables-a New Family of Generalized Skewed Distributions with 
Applications to Risk Estimation. Annals of Applied Statistics, 5(3), pp.2197–2230. 
Gordon, M., 2012. Ernst & Young paying $2M in audit settlement. The Seattle Times. Available at: 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/businesstechnology/2017455527_apusernstyoungfined.html 
[Accessed May 10, 2012]. 
Gore, P., Pope, P.F. & Singh, A.K., 2007. Earnings management and the distribution of earnings relative to 
targets: UK evidence. Accounting and Business Research, 37(2), pp.123–149. 
Graham, J.R., Li, S. & Qiu, J., 2008. Corporate misreporting and bank loan contracting. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 89(1), pp.44–61. 
Guttman, I., Kadan, O. & Kandel, E., 2006. A Rational Expectations Theory of Kinks in Financial 
Reporting. The Accounting Review, 81(4), pp.811–848. 
Hayes, B., 2005. Why W? American Scientist, 93(2), pp.104–108. 
Hayn, C., 1995. The information content of losses. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 20(2), pp.125–
153. 
Heckman, J.J., 2010. Building Bridges between Structural and Program Evaluation Approaches to 
Evaluating Policy. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(2), pp.356–398. 
Jackson, S.B. & Liu, X. (Kelvin), 2010. The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts, Conservatism, and 
Earnings Management. Journal of Accounting Research, 48(3), pp.565–601. 
Jacob, J. & Jorgensen, B.N., 2007. Earnings management and accounting income aggregation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics, 43(2-3), pp.369–390. 
Jiambalvo, J., 1996. Discussion of “Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of 
Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC”. Contemporary Accounting Research, 13(1), 
pp.37–47. 
Karpoff, J.M., Lee, D.S. & Martin, G.S., 2008a. The consequences to managers for financial 
misrepresentation. Journal of Financial Economics, 88(2), pp.193–215. 
Karpoff, J.M., Lee, D.S. & Martin, G.S., 2008b. The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books. Journal of 
Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 43(03), pp.581–611. 
Kedia, S. & Philippon, T., 2009. The Economics of Fraudulent Accounting. The Review of Financial 
Studies, 22(6), pp.2169–2199. 
Kedia, S. & Rajgopal, S., 2011. Do the SEC’s enforcement preferences affect corporate misconduct? 
Journal of Accounting and Economics, 51(3), pp.259–278. 
Kerstein, J. & Rai, A., 2007. Intra-year shifts in the earnings distribution and their implications for earnings 
management. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 44(3), pp.399–419. 
Kirschenheiter, M. & Melumad, N.D., 2002. Can “Big Bath” and Earnings Smoothing Co-Exist as 
Equilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies? Journal of Accounting Research, 40(3), pp.761–796. 
Kumar, P. & Langberg, N., 2009. Corporate fraud and investment distortions in efficient capital markets. 
RAND Journal of Economics, 40(1), pp.144–172. 
Leone, A.J. & Van Horn, R.L., 2005. How do nonprofit hospitals manage earnings? Journal of Health 
Economics, 24(4), pp.815–837. 
Liang, B., 2003. The Accuracy of Hedge Fund Returns. The Journal of Portfolio Management, 29(3), 
  24 
pp.111–122. 
Marquardt, C.A. & Wiedman, C.I., 2004. How Are Earnings Managed? An Examination of Specific 
Accruals. Contemporary Accounting Research, 21(2), pp.461–491. 
McCracken, S., Salterio, S.E. & Gibbins, M., 2008. Auditor-client management relationships and roles in 
negotiating financial reporting. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33, pp.362–383. 
Moehrle, S.R., 2002. Do firms use restructuring charge reversals to meet earnings targets? Accounting 
Review, 77(2), pp.397–413. 
Nelson, M.W., Elliott, J.A. & Tarpley, R.L., 2002. Evidence from Auditors about Managers’ and Auditors’ 
Earnings Management Decisions. The Accounting Review, 77(s-1), pp.175–202. 
Newman, D.P., Patterson, E. & Smith, R., 2001. The influence of potentially fraudulent reports on audit 
risk assessment   and planning. Accounting Review, 76(1), pp.59–80. 
Parte Esteban, L. & Such Devesa, M.J., 2011. Earnings Management in the Spanish Hotel Industry. Cornell 
Hospitality Quarterly, 52(4), pp.466–479. 
Perreault, S. & Kida, T., 2011. The relative effectiveness of persuasion tactics in auditor–client 
negotiations. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 36(8), pp.534–547. 
Sankar, M.R. & Subramanyam, K.R., 2001. Reporting Discretion and Private Information Communication 
through Earnings. Journal of Accounting Research, 39(2), pp.365–386. 
Scott, T.C., Mann, R. & Martinez, R.E., 2006. General relativity and quantum mechanics: towards a 
generalization of   the Lambert W function - A generalization of the Lambert W function. 
Applicable Algebra in Engineering Communication and Computing, 17(1), pp.41–47. 
Shuto, A., 2009. Earnings Management to Exceed the Threshold: A Comparative Analysis of   
Consolidated and Parent-only Earnings. Journal of International Financial Management & 
Accounting, 20(3), pp.199–239. 
   ec-1 
Appendix A: Estimation of Model Parameters 
In this appendix, I discuss issues related to estimating the parameters of the model. The first issue to 
deal with is sample observation homogeneity. Only firms similar to each other are expected to have similar 
parameter values and hence may be pooled together for estimation. In the extreme case, only time-series 
observations of a firm may be used for estimating firm-specific parameters. This is usually impractical 
because the majority of firms have relatively short histories. The sample size is unlikely to be large enough 
to obtain reliable estimates of the firm-specific parameters, especially when the structure of the model 
demands nonlinear estimation.  
To get around the difficulty, some strong assumptions are required to pool firm observations together 
for cross-sectional / panel estimation. One commonly used approach is to group firms together based on 
their similarities in certain aspects, e.g., industry membership, firm size proxied by total assets / market 
value / sales, risk level proxied by beta, etc. As far as the model is concerned, industry membership is 
exogenously determined, unlikely to be affected by earnings management activities. However, past 
earnings manipulations can affect total assets. Moreover, earnings manipulations and total assets can affect 
sales (e.g., by early revenue recognition) and market value. Therefore, the usual method of ranking firms 
by decile based on the above-mentioned characteristics may not be able to group truly similar firms 
together.  
One way that might improve the grouping is to classify firms iteratively as follows. After the initial 
grouping that allows estimation of the parameters, one can compute the predicted unmanaged earnings and 
adjust the total assets accordingly. If this leads to a significantly different grouping of the firms based on 
the adjusted total assets, re-estimating the parameters after re-grouping might be necessary.  
Suppose the sample observation homogeneity issue has been addressed. The next issue is about the 
estimation method. Given the nonlinear nature of the model, the maximum likelihood (ML) method seems 
to be the natural choice. However, the correction for the discovered unintentional errors causes a 
complication. In the following, I will first discuss the likelihood function conditional on εq. Then 
integrating the conditional likelihood function with the assumed normal distribution of εq gives the 
expected likelihood function for maximization.    
Suppose that the parametric assumptions of a linear misreporting cost function and a Weibull 
adjustment requirement cost distribution G(l; λ, ½) = 1 – exp[–(λl)½] are made. Moreover, assume that the 
unmanaged earnings y are normally distributed with a density function n(y; y¯, σ¯ 2), where the unknown 
mean y¯ and variance σ¯ 2 are to be estimated as well. Conditional on εq, the observed post-audit earnings r 
are simply y – εq or m – εq, depending on whether an adjustment is required or not. The probabilities of 
these events are G(ka*2/2; λ, ½) = 1 – exp(–ηa*) and 1 – G(ka*2/2; λ, ½) = exp(–ηa*), respectively.  
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Let  
P(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η) = exp[–η( a*◦b(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η) )], 
where a*◦b is the composite function of a* as a function of b and b as a function of y. The function P is the 
probability of no adjustment expressed directly as a function of y. Depending on whether an adjustment is 
required or not, one can infer that y = r + εq or m = r + εq, respectively. Since m can be mapped back into y 
through Y(µ), the latter case means   
y = Y ◦µ(r + εq; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η), 
where Y ◦µ is the composite function of Y as a function of µ and µ as a function of m.  
Conditional on εq, the likelihood of observing post-audit earnings r is     
Λ(r; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η, y¯, σ¯ 2 | εq)  
= n(r + εq; y¯, σ¯
 2)[1 – P(r + εq; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η)]  
+ n(Y ◦µ(r + εq; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η); y¯, σ¯ 2)P(Y ◦µ(r + εq; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η); z, c0, α, σu
2q, η).  
Let  
Λ¯(r; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η, y¯, σ¯ 2) = ∫
∞
∞−
 
 
Λ(r; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η, y¯, σ¯ 2 | εq)n(εq; 0, qσu
2)dεq, 
which is the expected likelihood of observing post-audit earnings r. Moreover, denote by rj the jth firm-
year observation. Under the assumption of independent observations, maximizing 
∑j ln[ Λ¯(rj; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η, y¯, σ¯ 2) ] 
with respect to the parameters gives the ML estimates.  
Clearly, the k and λ that constitute η cannot be separately identified. Neither can σu
2 and q. Whether 
the remaining parameters can be reliably identified depends on the sensitivity of the log expected 
likelihood function to the parameters. As usual, there might be multiple local maxima. So care must be 
taken to increase the chance of identifying the global ML estimates.    
Suppose q differs systematically between big and non-big auditors. By hypothesizing that q is a linear 
function of a BIG dummy variable for the auditor type, the variable can be used as an explanatory variable 
for estimating the parameters. 
In addition, suppose one can determine a restricted sample where firms are believed to use the analyst 
consensus forecast as the earnings benchmark. Then instead of estimating z as a parameter, the analyst 
consensus forecast may be used as an explanatory variable for estimation. Moreover, if a benchmark 
selection model could be formulated to describe the decision to choose a benchmark from the three 
common alternatives, the selection model could be used for joint estimation together with the expected 
likelihood function.  
Besides using r for estimation, the audit fee F may also be used. Even for a sample with observations 
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from comparable firms only, the observed audit fees may differ from the F specified by the model. This is 
due to unmodeled factors that may contribute to the differences. By choosing the parameters to minimize 
the sum of the squared differences, nonlinear least squares (LS) estimates of the parameters can be 
obtained.  
To understand the nonlinear LS estimation procedure, first note that the audit fee is determined before 
the auditor knows the pre-audit earnings m, or any clue of the unmanaged earnings y. Under the 
assumption of a competitive audit market, the audit fee F is set to equate with the sum of the expected 
adjustment requirement, audit, and liability costs to the auditor:     
Ey[ EX[ (X)1{X ≤ L} + (L)[1 – 1{X ≤ L}] | a = a
* ] ] + [cu(q) + Lu], 
where Lu = E[kuε1–q
2/2] = ku(1–q)σu
2/2, with ku > 0, is assumed to be the expected liability cost arising from 
failing to remove all the unintentional errors and cu(q) is assumed to be the cost of conducting an audit 
with a quality level q. Note that  
EX[ (X)1{X ≤ L} | a = a
* ]  
= ∫ 2
 
0 
2*
ka
lg(l; λ, ½)dl  
= ∫ 2
),,,,;(
 
0 
22
0
*
ησα qczybka
u
o
lg(l; λ, ½)dl,  
where g(l; λ, ½) = (½)(λ/l)½exp[–(λl)½], and  
EX[ [1 – 1{X ≤ L}] | a = a
* ]  
= 1 – G(ka*2/2; λ, ½)  
= exp(–ηa*) 
= exp[–η( a*◦b(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η) )] 
= P(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η).  
Moreover, recall that η = (kλ/2)½, and y is assumed to be normally distributed with a density function n(y; 
y¯, σ¯ 2). Hence, the audit fee specified by the model is given by the following function: 
F(z, c0, α, σu
2q, k, λ, y¯, σ¯ 2, cu(q)+Lu) 
= ∫∫
∞
∞−



2
))2(,,,,;(
 
0 
 
 
2½2
0
*
λσα kqczybka
u
o
lg(l; λ, ½)dl  
+ [k a*◦b(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η)2/2]P(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, (kλ/2)½) 


n(y; y¯, σ¯ 2)dy + [cu(q)+Lu],  
where cu(q)+Lu is treated as a single parameter for estimation, assuming that all firms in the sample have 
auditors of similar qualities. A change of the variable l in the inner integral cannot group k and λ together to 
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appear as a product as in η. So in principle k and λ can be separately identified when the audit fee is used 
for estimation.  
For the model parameters to be identifiable, at least one explanatory variable must be included 
besides the observed audit fee, denoted by Fj, as the dependent variable. For example, suppose that it is 
reasonable to believe that the firms use the analyst consensus forecasts, denoted by zj’s, as the earnings 
benchmarks. The nonlinear LS estimates can then be obtained by minimizing  
∑j [ Fj – F(zj, c0, α, σu
2q, k, λ, y¯, σ¯ 2, cu(q)+Lu) ]
2 
with respect to the parameters.  
Besides the possibility of being trapped in a local extremum, another challenge of using nonlinear 
estimation methods (like ML or nonlinear LS discussed above) is that the iterative process of finding an 
extremum might not converge. Initializing the process with good starting values raises the odds of 
convergence but is more art than science.      
Finally, suppose moment conditions could be derived to capture the discontinuity and volcano shape 
of the earnings triplet distributions. Then the generalized method of moments (GMM) could also be used 
to estimate the model parameters.    
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Appendix B: Extensions  
In the main text, I treat the quality level of the audit as an exogenous parameter. In this appendix, I 
discuss how it can be endogenized. Moreover, if the firm takes the earnings forecast by a particular analyst 
(e.g., a star analyst) as the earnings benchmark, the model can be extended to include the analyst’s decision 
on setting the forecast. This possibility and the further extension of allowing for multiple analysts are also 
discussed below.  
B.1 Endogenous Audit Quality  
For simplicity, suppose the auditor can observe z when choosing q. Assuming instead that he knows at 
that time only a signal of the z to be used by the firm would not change the modeling critically. 
Alternatively, if the value of z is simultaneously chosen by another player, say, a star analyst (see 
subsection B.2), the following approach still goes through as long as the auditor can at the time of 
choosing q correctly anticipate the equilibrium value of z.  
Given any (conjectured) z and the anticipated optimal manipulation a*◦b and optimal adjustment 
decision x*◦a*◦b, both expressed as functions of y directly, the auditor chooses q to minimize the sum of the 
expected adjustment requirement, audit, and liability costs below (see appendix A for the derivation):     
∫∫
∞
∞−



2
))2(,,,,;(
 
0 
 
 
2½2
0
*
λσα kqczybka
u
o
lg(l; λ, ½)dl  
+ [ka*◦b(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η)2/2]P(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, (kλ/2) ½) 


n(y; y¯, σ¯ 2)dy + [cu(q) + Lu],  
where cu(0) = 0, cu′(q) > 0, and cu″(q) ≥ 0, Lu = E[kuε1–q
2/2] = ku(1–q)σu
2/2, with ku > 0, n(y; y¯, σ¯
 2) is the 
density function of the unmanaged earnings y assumed to follow a normal distribution, and P(y; z, c0, α, 
σu
2q, η) = exp[–η( a*◦b(y; z, c0, α, σu
2q, η) )]. Although the objective function above looks quite 
complicated, the intuition behind it is simple. The auditor’s choice of q will have direct impacts on the 
audit cost cu(q) and on the expected liability cost Lu arising from failing to discover all unintentional errors. 
In addition, the choice can affect the marginal expected benefit of manipulation b and thereby influence the 
optimal manipulation a*. Consequently, the probability of no adjustment P is affected. So is the expected 
adjustment requirement cost conditional on an adjustment, as well as the expected liability cost related to 
earnings manipulation conditional on no adjustment. These two costs are represented by the two terms in 
the large square brackets in the auditor’s objective function.  
Analytically solving for the optimal q* is challenging because of the complexity of a*. Numerical 
exploration seems to be a more viable route to gain insights about q*. If an analytical solution is still 
desirable, one can consider finding out q* using a first-order “mechanism design” approach. The idea is to 
let the auditor choose q and also the manipulation a, subject to the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint 
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given by condition FOC that characterizes the optimal manipulation selected by the firm. The optimal a* 
for this formulation minimizes the total costs to the auditor given the optimal q* and the IC constraint. 
Similarly, the optimal q* for this formulation minimizes the total costs given the optimal a* for this 
formulation and the IC constraint. The approach allows finding out q* without directly dealing with the 
firm-chosen a* as a function of q. This seems to be analytically less difficult than the original formulation 
of the auditor’s decision on the quality level. 
B.2 Analyst Forecast as Earnings Benchmark 
Consider the case where the value of z is set by a star analyst. It seems reasonable to suppose that the 
analyst cannot observe q* when he sets the value of z. However, if the structure and parameters of the 
model are common knowledge, in equilibrium he would be able to anticipate q* correctly.  
Given any conjectured q and the anticipated distribution of r conditional on z, the analyst chooses z to 
minimize 
Er[ ωz – (z – r)
2 | z ], 
where (z – r)2 is the squared forecast error and ω > 0. This objective function assumes that the analyst 
receives more benefit from a higher (i.e., more optimistic) forecast but also bears more cost due to a larger 
squared forecast error. The parameter ω captures the relative importance of the benefit and cost to the 
analyst. Solving the analyst’s problem gives an optimal forecast z*. When evaluated at the equilibrium q*, 
the optimal forecast is a function of ω.  
Suppose the model is extended further to allow for multiple analysts following the firm. Their 
differences can be modeled as a distribution of the parameter ω. The analyst giving the mean forecast, 
often referred to as the consensus forecast, can be defined as the star analyst assumed in the single-analyst 
extension.   
Suppose that in the multiple-analyst extension what the firm really cares is an updated forecast of the 
star analyst, which is not known when choosing the manipulation. However, the firm knows that the 
updated forecast is a random variable distributed normally with a mean equal to the initial consensus 
forecast known to the firm and with a variance depending on the initial dispersion of the analyst forecasts. 
Then the forecast dispersion would have an impact on the optimal manipulation much like the effect of εq’s 
variance qσu
2 that influences a* through b. This way, analyst forecast dispersion could also be incorporated 
into the model. 
    
Table 1: Notations 
y ∈ (–∞,∞) is the unmanaged earnings of the firm 
z ∈ (–∞,∞) is the earnings benchmark affecting the firm’s incentive to manipulate earnings 
a ∈ (–∞,∞) is the earnings manipulation chosen by the firm 
m = y + a is the pre-audit earnings (or managed earnings) provided to the auditor for audit. 
q ∈ [0,1] is the quality level of the audit. 
εq ~ Normal(0, qσu
2), with σu > 0, is the part of the unintentional errors contained in y that is 
discovered and removed by the auditor.  
ε1–q  ~ Normal(0, (1–q)σu
2) is the part of the unintentional errors remaining in y even after the audit. 
L = ka2/2, where k > 0, is the expected liability cost to the auditor arising from tolerating the earnings 
manipulation.   
x ∈ {0,1} is the auditor’s adjustment decision. 
X ∈ [0,∞) is the auditor’s cost of requiring an adjustment, which follows a probability distribution 
G(l) = Pr{X ≤ l}, with a differentiable probability density g(l) = G′(l) > 0 for all l > 0 and a 
differentiable hazard rate function h(l) = [1–G(l)]/g(l). The existence of bounded limits liml↓0 
l½g(l) and liml↓0 [g(l) + 2lg′(l)] is assumed.  
x*(a) = 1{X ≤ L} is the optimal adjustment decision 
c(a) = the firm’s misreporting cost, where c(0) = 0, lima↑∞ c(a) = ∞, c′(a) > 0 with c′(0) = c0 < ∞, and 
c″(a) ≥ 0. 
b = E[exp(–α[y – z – εq])] = exp[–α(y – z) + α
2σu
2q/2] is the “marginal expected benefit of 
manipulation” that summarizes the impacts of the quality parameter q and the deviation of y 
from z on the firm’s misreporting incentive. 
v = (1 – b)/α + [1 – G(L)][ b[1 – exp(–αa)]/α – c(a) ], with α > 0, is the firm’s expected net benefit 
from earnings manipulation. 
y0 = z – (lnc0)/α + ασu
2q/2 is the cutoff of the unmanaged earnings that determines whether the 
optimal manipulation is upward or downward. 
λ > 0 is the reciprocal of the scale parameter of a Weibull adjustment requirement cost distribution. 
θ = ½ is the shape parameter of a Weibull adjustment requirement cost distribution that simplifies the 
first-order condition for the optimal manipulation, allowing the solution to be expressed in 
closed form. 
η = (kλ/2)½ is a parameter capturing the relative importance of the expected liability cost and 
adjustment requirement cost to the auditor. 
W = the Lambert W function, which is the (multi-valued) inverse of the function f(W) = Wexp(W). 
The real branch of the function has an upper and a lower (single-valued) segment defined on the 
domains [–exp(–1),∞) and [–exp(–1),0], respectively. The two segments are denoted by W0 and 
W–1, respectively, with W0 ≥ –1 ≥ W–1. 
µ = exp( –α(m – z) + α2σu
2q/2 )/c0 is the counterpart of b for Y(µ), the inverse mapping from m back 
to y. 
r = xy + (1 – x)m – εq is the post-audit earnings (or reported earnings) announced to the public. 
δr = [xy + (1 – x)m – εq] – z is the post-audit excess earnings. 
r1 = the lagged post-audit earnings. 
∆r = [xy + (1 – x)m – εq] – r1 is the post-audit earnings change.  
   
   
  
Figure 1:  Timeline of events in the model 
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Figure 3a.  Optimal manipulation and marginal expected benefit of manipulation 
as functions of unmanaged earnings
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Figure 3b.  Pre−audit earnings as a function of unmanaged earnings
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Figure 4a.  Distributions of pre−audit and unmanaged earnings
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Figure 4b.  Normal distribution of unmanaged earnings transformed into 
volcano−shaped distribution of pre−audit earnings
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Figure 5a.  Frequency distributions of simulated excess earnings 
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Figure 5c.  3D plot of frequency distributions of simulated excess earnings
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Figure 6a.  Frequency distributions of simulated earnings
 y0 − z
Simulated earnings distributions
Post−audit: r = xy + (1 − x)m − εq
Unmanaged: y
Pre−audit: m
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y
Earnings level
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
lllll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
llllll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
ll
llll
l
ll
lll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
lll
l
l
l
ll
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
lll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
llll
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
lll
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
ll
l
l
l
ll
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
llll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
−0.10 −0.05 0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
Close−up of the distribution of 
simulated post−audit earnings
−1.0 −0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0
0
50
10
0
15
0
20
0
25
0
30
0
Figure 6b.  Frequency distributions of earnings in 1988−2006
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Figure 7a.  Frequency distributions of simulated earnings differences
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Figure 7b.  Frequency distributions of earnings change in 1988−2006
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